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We use a panel of European countries to investigate whether or not governments interact with 
their neighbors when they decide their fiscal policy; we consider both taxes and expenditures, 
at aggregate and at separate aspects of policy. We analyse possible different competitive 
behaviours and find evidence of fiscal interdependencies consistently with the literature on 
tax and yardstick competition. For corporate taxes, the regression results suggest that 
European countries follow large countries in order to attract capital; for income taxes and 
public expenditures, instead, fiscal interactions exist but they are mainly due to yardstick 
competition. Finally, we have found the countries are interdependent with each others before 
joining the EU, and than, once they are in, they become more independent. 
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Do countries compete with each others in order to attract tax bases? Do voters care about
foreign policy makers￿￿scal choices when they make their voting decisions? Do policy
makers respond to foreign ￿scal policies? All these questions are related by the idea that
state￿ s ￿scal policies are dependent on their neighbours￿policies and the common view
is that the ongoing process of globalisation has contributed to these interdependencies in
several ways. First, in more open economies, capital and investment are more free to move
internationally, and this is making governments more responsive to other governments
actions in order to attract tax base; second, more circulation of information and ideas
has made it easier for people to compare di⁄erent countries performaces and to get "the
full picture" both with respect to the "goodness" of their domestic policies and to the
possibility of developing their business plans abroad. Moreover, as a consequence of
globalisation, countries￿national borders are becoming weaker and less de￿ned;1 as a
result, in order to survive and preserve their interests, countries are getting together to
sign agreements of mutual cooperation and form unions. The case of Europe and the
European Union is an interesting example of these phenomena, and it is also the subject
of this paper. In particular, we address the question whether or not European governments
in￿ uence each others in determining their ￿scal choices, and wether or not there is a role
played by the EU as an Institution in a⁄ecting the level of ￿scal interactions.
There are three main theoretical explanations why countries should be a⁄ected by
their ￿ neighbors￿when they determine their policy choices; all these rely on the common
assumption that countries behave strategically with each others.
The ￿rst explanation is based on the idea that there exist expenditure externalities
among jurisdictions and therefore state policy choices are not independent from each
other. An example of these type of externalities is the amount of public investments
in infrastructures in a country (such as roads, airports, rail-tracks) whose bene￿ts spill
over in neighboring countries, and lower the level of investments in the latter countries,
1There is a widespread ideas of retreat of States. Among them :￿Where states were once the masters
of markets, now it is the markets which ....are masters over the governments of states￿(Susan Strange,
The Retreat of the State, 1996), ￿The glue holding nation-states together, at least in economic terms, has
begun to dissolve￿ . (Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State, 1996); ￿Foreign trade and investment
have now become the ultimate yardsticks for evaluating government actions..(there is) a remarkable
consensus on the imperative of global economic integration.￿(Dani Rodrik, Trading in Illusions, Foreign
Policy magazine, 2001).
2because of free riding behavior.
The second type of interdependence is based on the idea that citizens can evaluate the
performances of their policy makers by comparing the same policy choices taken by the
neighboring countries￿policy makers. In the case domestic policy makers perform worse
than foreigners, citizens "punish" them by not voting for them the next elections. Policy
makers anticipate voters behavior and "follow" their neighboring colleagues￿choices. This
idea of ￿ yardstick￿competition has been initially explored by Besley and Case (1995),
who also con￿rm the theory by ￿nding evidence for this using data from U.S. States.
More recent works include Besley and Smart (2003), Bordignon, Cerniglia and Revelli
(2003, 2004).
The third type of explanation why ￿scal choices are not independent is based on the
tax competition literature: countries compete with their neighbors in order to attract
tax bases. The theoretical literature on tax competition is now voluminous, an important
branch of it develops the well-known Zodrow-Mieszkowski-Wilson (ZMW) model (Zodrow
and Mieszkowski, (1986), Wilson, (1986)) of tax setting with mobile capital in various
directions (see Wilson, (1999) for a survey).
Alternative to these theories of strategic interactions; Manski (1993) suggests that
￿scal choices appear to be interdependent not because countries behave strategically but
because they actually follow a "common intellectual trend" that drives ￿scal choices in
the same directions. A situation like this occurs for example because policy makers meet
at various international meetings,2 and they are able to discuss and share views on ￿scal
policies, or, alternatively, an in￿ uential international organization or a famous economist
has expressed their opinions or recommendations about policy issues.
However, even if there are various theories of ￿scal policy interdependencies, when
we want to empirically test the theory, for all these cases the common way to proceed
is to estimate ￿ ￿scal reaction functions￿ , i.e. parameters which indicate whether any
particular ￿scal authority will change a tax rate or an expenditure level in response to
changes in the same variable by other authorities. This empirical literature was initiated
by a pioneering study by Case, Hines and Rosen (1993), who estimate an empirical model
of strategic interaction in expenditures among state governments in the US. Our paper is
a contribution to this literature; we estimate ￿scal reaction functions for European states
￿scal policies; we think that our study is distinctive in several ways.
2Like various G7, G8 meetings or the Finance Ministers of the EU members meet regularly in the
ECO￿n Councils.
3First, to our knowledge, it is the only paper investigating together both taxes and
public expenditures, and not only at aggregates but at separate aspects of policy. This
is a an important issue that has not received enough attention (see Wildasin (2004) ) for
a discussion). Second, this is the ￿rst paper in this branch of the literature using the
all set of western European countries.3 Speci￿cally, on public expenditures side, existing
studies are so far based on US States datasets; they are the already mentioned Case, Hines
and Rosen (1993) and Baicker (2005) who basically replicates Case, Hines and Rosen￿ s
paper using di⁄erent econometric techniques. On tax side, most of the existing empirical
works on tax reaction functions has employed data on local (business) property tax rates
(Brueckner, 1998, Brett and Pinkse, 2000, Heyndels and Vuchelen, 1998), or on local
or state income taxes (Besley and Case, 1995, Heyndels and Vuchelen, 1998). The only
exceptions are Besley, Gri¢ th and Klemm (2001) and Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano
(2002) who estimate reaction functions for OECD countries and Altshuler and Goodspeed
(2004) who study reactions functions for a subset of European countries. More in detail,
we estimate reaction functions for taxes, on income and capital, and public expenditures,
both aggregated and disaggregated (education, health and defence), using a dataset on
western European countries for the period 1970-99. The aim of the analysis is three-fold.
First,we test whether or not ￿scal choices are independent among European countries (i.e.
if the coe¢ cient if the reaction function is non zero).
Second, we extend the analysis to determine whether these interdependencies are due
to strategic interactions (tax, yardstick competition, ￿scal externalities) or just common
trend; this is mainly based on the distinction between the characteristics of the di⁄erent
￿scal choices, the responsiveness to them by voters and the type of neighbours with whom
to interact. To anticipate the ￿ avour of the analysis that will be developed in detail in
the next section; corporate taxes mainly a⁄ect ￿rms￿location and investments4 but only
a minority of voters, therefore any strategic behavior by governments should be related
to tax competition to attract tax bases rather than to yardstick competition to please
voters. Income taxes, instead, hit income from labour, the less mobile factor, and are
3with the exception of Altshuler and Goodspeed (2004) -who use a dataset on Western European
countries to investigate the existence of ￿scal interdependenciesHowever, they consider only a subset of
EU Countries and study only capital and labour taxes.Moreover their paper also di⁄ers in the way taxes
are calculated, they use a backward measure of taxes based on the ratio between tax revenue and GDP,
while we use instead directly the tax rates set by governments and we consider also public expenditures
4See Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2002) for a discussion about that.
4of interest for most of voters; therefore any kind of interdependence should be linked to
yardstick competition. If governments behave strategically toward their voters in order to
be reelected, we should especially ￿nd positive sloped reaction functions for those expen-
ditures which are most visible to voters such as education and health. Governments could
also try to compete with other countries, in order to attract investments and therefore tax
base, by undertaking investments in infrastructures (see on this topic Wooders and Zis-
simos (2001)). All these type of interdependencies imply that the reaction functions are
positively sloped; but if, instead, they are related to positive ￿scal externalities between
countries we should expect a negatively sloped reaction function. This could be the case,
for example, for expenditures in defence of friendly countries.
Finally, we investigates whether or not there is an "EU e⁄ect", in other words, if being
a member of the European Union may determine a di⁄erent level of ￿scal interactions.
For example, if countries join the EU to lower the competitive pressure from a more and
more globalised world and operate in a more protected environment, on one hand, this
should lower the level of ￿scal interactions due to a competitive behavior; but, on the
other hand, since there are less competitive barriers among members, this should also
higher interactions between member states. Similarly countries outside the EU should
have higher level of interactions because they operate in a more open environment and
also may want to follow EU states in order to being accepted in the EU.
The results support the idea that states act interdependently when they take their
policy decisions both with respect to expenditures and taxes; however, with di⁄erent
motivations. For corporate taxes, for example, consistently with the previous empirical
studies on tax competition, the regression results suggest that European countries compete
with each other in order to attract capital and, in particular, following big countries. For
income taxes and public expenditures, instead, we have found that ￿scal interactions exist
but are mainly due to yardstick competition, mainly with respect geographical neighbor
and ￿leader￿countries. Moreover, consistently with our expectations, the results for dis-
aggregated public expenditures suggest that governments behave strategically only with
respect to those expenditures which are more directly comparable such as expenditures
in education.
Finally, we have found the countries are more interdependent with each other before
they join the EU, and than, once they are in, they become more independent. This
behavior is possibly due to the fact that countries who want to join the EU want to show
to other EU members that they share similar policies in order to be accepted and also







































Timing More in election year Not specific Not specific Not specific
because the EU provides a safer environment where countries need to compete less with
the outside world but interact more among themselves.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses how we
can distinguish di⁄erent competitive behaviors based on the analysis of types of choices,
neighbors and responsiveness by citizens. Section 3 presents the empirical methodology,
section 4 the data and, section 5 the results. Discussion and conclusions are in the last
part of the paper.
2. Testing the theories
As mentioned in the introduction, when we want to test empirically di⁄erent models of
￿scal interactions, the common way to proceed is to estimate ￿scal reaction functions.
However, as it stands, it is not possible to distinguish the true nature of these interdepen-
dencies. In this section we explore how we can overcome to this problem by extending
the analysis to take into account di⁄erent types of ￿scal choices and neighbors, and re-
sponsiveness by citizens to policies. We use Table 1 to make our point.
In the columns we distinguish between the four theoretical explanations of ￿scal policy
dependencies: yardstick competition, tax competition, positive externality and common
6trends. The ￿rst three are due to a strategic behavior y governments while the latter
is due to a common "intellectual trend". We analyze them in turn in relation to four
characteristics: i) the expected sign of the reaction functions￿coe¢ cients, ii) the type of
￿scal choices relative to the degree of interest by voters, the mobility of the tax base and
the possibility of spillovers, iii) the type of neighbors with whom it is likely to interact
and, ￿nally, iv) the timing of the interactions.
Yardstick competition occurs when policy makers in one jurisdiction adjust their poli-
cies in response to neighboring jurisdictions￿policy changes because citizens make their
voting decisions based on the comparison between domestic and foreign policies. Voters
do not cast their vote for the incumbent if they think she has not performed well enough.
So, anticipating their behavior, policy makers will cut (raise) taxes or expenditures if
neighbors cut (raise) theirs; this implies that the sign of the reaction function￿ s coe¢ cient
has to be positive under this hypothesis. Moreover, it is more likely that yardstick com-
petition occurs with respect to those policies whose voters care most, like, for example,
expenditures in education or income taxes, rather than capital taxes. To give an idea, it
is useful to think about the victory in the UK general elections of the Labour Party over
the Conservative Party after over twenty years. One of the keys of the success of Tony
Blair￿ s political campaign has been recognized to be the stress put on service delivery,
like the famous slogan "Education, Education, Education". It is also likely that policy
comparisons mainly occur with respect to geographically close countries or countries with
similar characteristic or important and big countries. Finally, another characteristic of
yardstick competition, not in common with the other types of interactions, is that it is
very likely that interaction will be higher in the period of elections when voters make
their ￿nal voting decisions.
Like for yardstick competition, the coe¢ cient of the reaction function in the case of
tax competition has to be positive. However, the main feature is that the tax base has to
be mobile, and this is clearly the case for capital taxes, which hit ￿rms and investments
which are highly mobile across countries, especially in more open economies. The countries
which whom it is more likely to engage competition to attract tax bases are more open
countries, or leader countries. We do not expect, in principle, any di⁄erent strategic
behavior in the period of election, since, also, capital taxes are not usually of interest for
voters.
The main di⁄erence between the case of (positive) externality and all the other behav-

































Figure 1. About the Nature of Interactions
of free riding behavior. Also, it will mainly occur with respect to geographically close
countries and, elections should not interfere with the level of interactions.
Finally, if it is only a common trend that drives countries policies in the same direction,
we should expect a positive sign of the interaction coe¢ cient, but not a speci￿c pattern
in the type of countries which whom to interact and, no di⁄erent interactions because of
elections.
Now, with the help of Figure 1, we illustrate how we proceed in the analysis. We
begin with the estimation of the ￿scal reaction functions, and we check if the interactions
coe¢ cient is signi￿cantly non-zero, in that case, trivially, there are no interactions. If the
coe¢ cient is negative, it is the case of positive ￿scal externality, if it is positive, instead,
we proceed further by checking if there is a higher level of interaction in the period of
elections. If this is the case, it almost certainly the case for yardstick competition. If it
is not the case, and, in addition, there is not a speci￿c pattern in the type of state which
whom the interactions occur, the most likely explanation is a common trend. If countries
react more with their neighbors or with leader countries and the tax base is mobile, the
main explanation is tax competition; alternatively, if the tax base is not mobile, we are
possibly in the presence of amenity competition.
83. Empirical Speci￿cation
As discussed in the previous sections, all theoretical models of strategic interactions have
the same empirical predictions that state i ￿scal choices (either public expenditures or
level of taxation) in year t, Eit, are a function of its neighbors same ￿scal choices , Ejt:In
practice, we allow Eit to depend on a vector of state speci￿c controls Xit, and, since we
estimate using pooled cross-sectional time series data, we include a state ￿xed e⁄ect ￿i.
This gives a speci￿cation in the most general form of
Eit = ￿i +
X
j6=i
￿ijEjt + Xit￿ + uit
where i = 1;:::n denotes a state, and t = 1;:::T a time period, ￿;￿ , and ￿ are unknown
parameters, and uit is a random error.
However, this cannot be estimated as it stands, as there are too many parameters ￿ij
to be estimated. The usual procedure in this case is to estimate
Eit = ￿i + ￿
0Ait + Xit￿ + tit￿ + uit (3.1)





and wij are exogenously chose weights, normalized so that
X
j6=i
wijt = 1;and wijt = 0 if
state j is not a ￿ neighbor￿or if j = i .
We consider six possible weighting schemes for (3.1), based on the analysis developed
in the previous section. The ￿rst is very simple, weights are assumed to be uniform, i.e.
wU
ij = 1
n￿1;all i;j: This will give us an useful benchmark and, in the case it works well,
will be in support of the hypothesis of "common intellectual trend", since, under this
hypothesis there should not be any di⁄erence in the degree of country neighborliness.
The second set of weights are constructed such that to support the hypothesis of
strategic interactions (either tax or yardstick competitions) and they are based on di⁄erent
concepts of neigborliness: they are geographical distance, GDP per capita distance weights,
GDP and EU weights. The ￿rst two are based on the idea that countries follows countries
close to them either geographically or with similar economic structure; the latter two
9introduce the concept of following a leader, which is represented either by the biggest
countries or by the EU as a whole.












where dij is the geographical distance between the capital of state i and state j. In the case
competition occurs between states with similar economic or demographic characteristics,
we construct a weighting matrix based on the inverse of the distance between GDP per









;with j 6= i;
note that contrary to most of the previous studies we allow the matrices to be time
variant.5
If countries follow a ￿ leader￿or a group of them, the weighting schemes that should







;with j 6= i;





j2EUt GDPjt if j 2 EUt; j 6= i
0 if j = 2 EUt; j 6= i
;
where EUt is the set of states that are EU members at time t.
Finally, we use another set of weights that are merely designed to represent tax com-
petition behavior, with these weights we assign higher values to countries that have more
open economies and, therefore, should be the main competitors in the race for attracting
tax bases. In this setting, they are based on country openness (here as trade as proportion
of GDP);6 in order to overcome the problem of temporary ￿ uctuation and endogeneity
of this variable we average three years together and than we lagged the resulting set of
5Previous studies like Case, Hines and Rosen used matrices based on the average of a variables over
time.
6We have tried FDI/GDP weights with similar results and therefore we have omitted them.











;with s = 3;4;5;and j 6= i:
In summary, the a priori choice of the weights is arbitrary, however after the estima-
tions are carried out it is possible to assess their goodness by selecting the regressions
that produces higher and more signi￿cant coe¢ cients and, in this way, understand better
the nature of these interdependencies.
Moreover there are two econometric issues determined by the presence on the RHS of
the equation (3.1) of the dependent variable. First, if states do react to each others￿￿scal
choices, then Ait is endogenous and correlated with the error term uit, we therefore we use
an IV approach. For this purpose and we need some source of variation correlated with
neighbors￿￿scal choices but uncorrelated with the error term. One potential source of
variation is neighbor Xs. So we create neighbor values for these variables multiplying them
by the same weights used for weighting the ￿scal variables and we use the weighted average
of neighbors￿control variables as instruments. We test the validity of the instrument set
using the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions.7
Second, if neighbors are subject to correlated random shocks, this determines a cor-
relation between states￿￿scal choices, which can be erroneously interpreted as causal
in￿ uence. So if we omit in the regressions variables that are spatially dependent, these
variables enter in the error term, and this complicates the estimation of (3.1). However
Kelejian and Prucha (1998) have demonstrated that even in the presence of spatial error
dependence, the IV method yields a consistent estimation of ￿:8
Moreover, while we would like to include time dummies, to capture shocks in each
period which are common to all countries, this is not generally feasible (see Devereux,
7This is carried out using ivreg2 in Stata.
8If we do not take into account spatial error dependence in equation (3.1), this would not bias the
estimation of ￿ but it would reduce the e¢ ciency of the estimation and produced biased standard errors.
There are two more ways in addition to IV method to deal with this. One approach is to use maximum
likelihood to estimate (3.1) taking into account of the error structure, this methodology has been explored
by Case et al. (1993). The other way is to estimate (3.1) by ML under the hypothesis of error indepen-
dence and rely on hypothesis tests to verify the absence of spatial correlation. Examples of this approach
can be found in Brueckner (1998), Saavedra (2000) and Brueckner and Saavedra (2001). Anselin et al
(1996) suggest a robust test that can be employed to detect the presence of spatial error dependance,
which is based on the analysis of the residual generated by regressing the dependent variables on the
exogenous variables using OLS.
11Lockwood and Redoano, 2002, for an explanation). However, we do allow for unobserved
factors varying over time as far as possible by also including country-speci￿c time trend
in all our regressions.
Another issue is that, in practice, our ￿scal choices are serially correlated, perhaps
because abrupt changes in the system are likely to be costly to governments, either because
of adjustment costs, or because such changes my be blocked at the political level by
interest groups. We therefore present t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by
country which are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation (Bertrand, Du￿ o and
Mullainathan, 2004).
Finally, we also present dynamic versions of model (3.1) by adding the lagged depen-
dent variable, Eit￿1.
Eit = ￿i + ￿Eit￿1 + ￿Ait + Xit￿ + tit￿ + uit (3.2)
The present of the lagged depend variable together with ￿xed e⁄ect generate another
additional methodological problem. In short panels, the Within Group estimator is biased
downward9. To deal with this problem we employ the GMM estimator developed by
Arellano and Bond in addition to the IV estimator of the interaction term, Ait: The GMM
estimator ￿rst-di⁄erences the estimating equation and uses lags of the dependent variable
from at least two periods earlier as well as lags of the RHS variables as instruments.10
4. The Data
We use annual data on the Western European states11 over the period 1970 -1999. We
consider several speci￿cations of the model, where the variable Eit takes in turn the
aggregated and disaggregated level of per capita public expenditures, and income and
capital tax rates.
9Under the within group transformation, the lagged dependent varibale becomes E￿
i;t￿1 = Ei;t￿1 ￿
1
T￿1(Ei;2 + :: + EiT): So if T were large enoght the bias above would be insigni￿cant and the problem
disappear (see also Roodman, 2006).
10This is implemented in Stata using xtabond2.
11We consider Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweeden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.
12On the expenditures side we use aggregated and disaggregated public expenditure both
per capita and as a proportion of GDP.12 In particular we consider total public expenditures
(TOTit), public expenditures in education (EDU it), health (HEAit) and, defence (DEFit).
These data have been collected from IFS- Government Finance Statistics Yearbook. Table
2 and 3 present summary statistics for these variables. In particular, if we disaggregate
the ￿gures by countries (table 3), we observe that despite there being a lot of variation
among countries on the level of public expenditure, which depends mainly on country-
speci￿c characteristics, they all seem to follow a quite similar pattern as shown in graphs
1 and 2.
About the nature of possible interactions of states￿public expenditures, we expect that
their existence is mainly due to yardstick competition, rather than to tax competition;
since interstate mobility of residents in Europe is quite low and it mainly based on the
labour market conditions rather then provision of public good. Another possible expla-
nation of public expenditures interdependencies among states could be also related not
to strategic interactions but to a common ￿ intellectual￿trend, as suggested by Manski
(1993), that drives countries ￿scal choices in the same directions. A priori we can predict
that yardstick competition occur with respect to those expenditure which are more ob-
servable and more of interest by voters, like Health or Education. Moreover, with respect
to the weight matrix, if a common intellectual trend rather than strategic interactions are
the reason for expenditure interdependences, we should expect that the coe¢ cient of the
interaction term in the case of the unweighted matrix is not performing any worse than
the other alternative settings.
On the side of the tax variables, we use measures of income and capital taxes. These
two taxes are both important, they overall account for more than 40% of the tax revenue.
The tax base, in the ￿rst case, is represented by the income of companies and it is highly
mobile across countries, in the second case, by the income of residents and is less mobile
but hits the majority of citizens. Therefore if there exist strategic interactions in corporate
taxes these should be mainly due to competitive behavior by governments in order to
expand their tax bases. Again, it is not possible to rule out a priori the hypothesis of a
common trend; but we have to rely on the comparison of performances of the di⁄erent
weighting matrices. Any strategic interactions in income taxes, instead, should mainly
12We only report result for teh case of per capita expenditures, since the results are better, and, also,
because this measure is not afectted by GDP variation across countries which may determine variations
in expenditures not due to policy making decisions.
13be related to government behavior trying to persuade their voters about the goodness
of their actions. So, if governments are concerned about tax competition, we should
expect a higher interaction of the factor more mobile, the capital, compared to the less
mobile, labour, as pointed out by Besley, Gri¢ th and Klemm (2001). If governments are,
instead, more concerned about possible yardstick competition, we would expect higher
interactions with respect to the taxation of the factor owned by the majority of voters. In
this case income taxes should be more interdependent than corporate taxes. If, again, the
hypothesis of a common intellectual trend is the correct one, we should not expect a worse
performance by the uniform weights compared to the other speci￿cations. For the income
tax we use the top income marginal rate (TINit); for the capital tax we use the statutory
corporate tax rate (CAPTAXit).13 The main source for statutory tax rates is the Price
Waterhouse -Corporate Taxes - A Worldwide Summary, and, for income taxes, we use
the top income rate, from Price Waterhouse - Individual Taxes- A Worldwide Summary.
We can observe that for most of the countries there has been a decrease in both statutory
and income tax rates.14
Moreover we use a set of time varying variables Xit which are conventionally assumed
to a⁄ect the determination of the above ￿scal choices. For descriptive statistics refer to
table 2 in the Appendix.These variables include:
1. Socio-demographic characteristics: total population (POPULit); proportion of pop-
ulation less than 14 years old and over 65 (PYOUNGit and POLDit respectively),
population density (PDENSit), proportion of women (PFEM it).
2. Economic variables: GDP per capita (GDPPCit), and, ￿nally, two measures of
country openness: foreign direct investment (FDIGDPit) and total trade (TRADEGDPit) as
a proportion of GDP:
13An alternative measure of capital taxes is proposed by Mendoza et al (1994), and it is based on
the ratio of tax payments to a measure of the operating surplus of the economy. This approach is not
ideal for analyzing the competition between jurisdictions over taxes on corporate income because, it does
not necessarily re￿ ect the impact of taxes on the incentive to invest in a particular location, because tax
revenues depend on the history of past investment and pro￿t and losses of a ￿rm, and also the aggregation
of ￿rms in di⁄erent tax positions, and also, this measure can vary considerably according to underlying
economic conditions, even when tax regimes do not change; the variation is therefore due to factors
outside the immediate control of the government (see more on this in Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano
(2002)).
14For a possible explanation see Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2002).
143. Political variables. EUit; is equal to 1 if the country is member of EU and 0 otherwise,
GOVPARTY it measures Cabinet composition in term of left parties in percentage
of total cabinet post, WOMENPARLit measures the composition of women in the
parliament, ￿nally ELECTit is equal to 1 if there is and election in that year (both
executive or legislative). Political variables in this dataset come from two sources:
Comparative Political Dataset 15 and Database of Political Institutions.16
5. Results
We estimate several versions of models (3.1) and (3.2), which represent the reaction func-
tions of one country￿ s ￿scal choices to other countries decisions. We summarize our results
in six sets of tables, one for each type of ￿scal choices; moreover each set of tables is formed
by three tables. Tables denoted with letter a present regression results for the static model
in (3.1); the results for the dynamic version of the model (3.2) are in tables denoted with
letters b and c. In tables cs the lagged dependent variable (Ait￿1) is estimated using GMM
estimator. In all our speci￿cations, since the interaction term Ait, appearing on the RHS
of (3.1) and (3.2), is endogenous and correlated with the error term, we instrument it by
creating the weighted average of the controls variables Xit, using the same weights using
for weighting the ￿scal variables.
The ￿scal choices taken into account (Eit) are the aggregated and disaggregated
(Health, Education and Defence) level of public expenditures per capita and two dif-
ferent types of taxes: corporate taxes and income taxes. In all our speci￿cations we
condition on year dummies, and country-speci￿c linear time trend (tit). In the ￿rst case
we want to control for unchanging characteristics of a state that may have an impact on
policy choices, in the second case we want to control for macroeconomic shocks.
Tables 4 report the regression results for the aggregated public expenditure. In table
4a, we present the results for the static model, (3.1). The coe¢ cients of the neighbor
average aggregated public expenditures (Ait) are always very signi￿cant and positive for
all our di⁄erent weights. The weights that perform better are GDP (0.970) and uniform
weights (0.899), the worst is Openness. The controls do not perform particularly well in
the regressions, the p values in most of the cases are below the threshold. It seems that
15Available at http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/mitarbeiter/ru_armingeon/CPD_Set_en.asp
16Available at http://www.worldbank.org/research/bios/pkeefer.htm
15being member of EU, having an high proportion of women in Parliament and being ruled
by a left wing party determine higher public expenditures. Moreover the composition of
population a⁄ects the level of public expenditure, having an higher proportion of old and
young people lowers (surprisingly) the level of expenditure (possibly because of income
constraint); large countries have higher public expenditure per capita, possibly deter-
mined by diseconomies of scale. Finally more open countries have smaller governments,
one possible explanation is because they may have to compete more internationally and
therefore lower their taxes (for more about that see the "e¢ ciency hypothesis" in Garret
and Mitchell (2001)17). Table 4b presents the result for the dynamic version of the model.
The interaction coe¢ cients become, as expected, much lower and less signi￿cant, but still
always positive. GDP and uniform weights are still the ones with better results, but now
the coe¢ cients are respectively 0.438 and 0.424. The lagged dependent variables is always
signi￿cant and positive, in all our speci￿cations the coe¢ cients are in the neighborhood of
0.7. The control variables are overall slightly more signi￿cant than in the previous set of
equations and still present the same signs. Surprisingly the coe¢ cient of GDP per capita
is negative and signi￿cant, this can be related with e¢ ciency hypothesis, where in order
to compete and attract tax base countries have to lower taxes and public expenditures.
Table 4c reports the results for the dynamic model using the Arellano-Bond GMM esti-
mator. Comparing table 4b and 4c, we note that the coe¢ cients of the lagged dependent
variable are higher in table 4c, as we expected. The interaction coe¢ cients are also higher
and always signi￿cant, and also it is con￿rmed that GDP and Uniform weights are the
ones that perform better. The coe¢ cients of the controls variables present the same trend
as in the previous tables. So, in principle, this seems to suggest the idea that either there
is a common trend driving public expenditures in the same direction or, alternatively,
policy makers follow big countries￿behaviors when they decide their public expenditure
setting, possible because of yardstick competition. However we need additional tests for
con￿rming the hypothesis, these will be the subject of our next section.
Table 5 presents regression results for public expenditure in Defence, an a priori
analysis of the characteristics of these type of expenditure suggests that it very unlikely
that we are in the presence of expenditure competition hypothesis; the more likely strategic
17Garrett and Mitchell (2001) ￿nd a negative relationship between government spending and openess
to trade in OECD countries. One possible explanation for this result is the so called ￿e¢ ciency e⁄ect￿ :
high taxation (especially of capital income) reduces the competitiveness of national ￿rms in international
markets and returns to investors so that there is an incentive for goverment to lower taxes and public
expenditures (also because of internal and external pressures).
16behavior could be either due to yardstick competition or driven by ￿scal externality, unless
it is just a common trend. Since in the period taken into account all the countries in the
sample were "friends" the possible externality would have to be a positive one, so the
regression coe¢ cients should be negative; i.e. if neighbors higher expenditures in defence
a state can lower its expenditures because it is protected by its "friend", and it can free
ride. However, as we can see from the tables, this is not our case: the coe¢ cient of the
interaction terms are always positive and signi￿cant in all our speci￿cations. Table 5a
present the static version of the model, the coe¢ cient of the interaction terms are always
very high (higher than the same model in table 1). The weights that presents better
results are Openness (0.819) and Uniform (0.777). The demographic controls suggest
that expenditures are lower when the proportion of young people is high, this may re￿ ect
the preference of this group of people toward this type of expenditures, and in large
countries, probably because of economies of scale. The set of political variables weakly
suggests that the proportion of women in parliament lower these expenditures, election
instead have opposite results. Being an EU member also increases public expenditures in
defence. Finally, countries with higher GDP and more open have higher expenditure in
defence.
Tables 5b and 5c present the dynamic version of the model. As expected the lagged
dependent variables is always positive and signi￿cant, but lower than the equivalent table
4b. The interaction terms are always signi￿cant and positive; the sets of weights producing
better results are as above Openness (0.41 in table 2b and 0.37 in table 2c) and Uniform
(0.38 in table 2b and 0.46 in table 2c).
The results for public expenditures in Health are reported in tables 6. In the static
version of the model there is a weak evidence of ￿scal interactions in public expenditure
on health in European countries. The only set of weights that presents some signi￿cant
results is GDP distance (coe¢ cient of interaction term is 0.75). The control variables
suggest, predictably, on one hand, that being large and rich, a member of EU and ruled
by the left wing party determines higher expenditures in health. On the other hand that
having a high proportion of women in Parliament and an open economy have a negative
impact on Health expenditures. The dynamic version of the model presented in table
6b, con￿rms and strengthens the suggestion that there are not many interdependencies
on health expenditures going on. The lagged dependent variable is always signi￿cant and
around 0.64 in all our speci￿cations. The control variables present generally the same
trend as in the previous set of tables. Similar commments apply to table 6c, where the
17GMM estimation is applied; the main di⁄erence is that, as expected, the lagged dependent
variables have here higher coe¢ cients and the interaction terms lower coe¢ cients than in
the corresponding regressions presented in table 6b.
Public expenditures in Education are in tables 7. The static version is in table 7a .
Here the interaction terms are positive but not very signi￿cant, the weights that perform
better are geographical distance, GDP and uniform; in the ￿rst two cases the coe¢ cient
is even bigger than 1. Open countries and EU members have lower expenditures in
education, while countries ruled by left wing parties higher. The dynamic versions of
the model are in table 7b (IV estimation) and 7c (GMM estimation), where the lagged
dependent variable is always positive and very signi￿cant and the coe¢ cient is always well
above 0.7. The interactions term present positive coe¢ cients but signi￿cant only for the
case of GDP distance in table 7b, better results instead are presented in table 7c where
the interaction term is signi￿cant in most of the cases (apart from GDP and EU). The
control variables behave in the same way as presented in table 7a.
Tables 1 to 4 have presented preliminary results for aggregated and disaggregated pub-
lic expenditures, in all our speci￿cations moving from the static version to the dynamic
version of the model we improve the estimation because the lagged dependent variable
is always very signi￿cant and positive, con￿rming that, like the theory suggests, public
expenditure decisions are greatly based on previous years decisions. We also have pre-
sented two versions of model (3.2) using di⁄erent econometric techniques, in both cases
the results are quite comparable, and, as we expected, the lagged dependent variables
are in most cases higher when GMM estimator is applied. In general GDP, geographical
distance and uniform weights are the ones that presents better results, this could, in the
￿rst instance, suggests a possible presence of yardstick completion, but further analysis
will be developed in the next session.
The results for the statutory corporate tax rate are summarized in table 8. For each of
the weights we ￿nd that the coe¢ cient of the average tax rate of the neighboring countries
is always positive and signi￿cant and always above 1, which means that if neighbors lower
their taxes by 1 point countries react by lowering it more than 1. However the introduction
of the lagged dependent variables, presented in tables 5b and 5c, lowers dramatically the
interaction coe¢ cient in all our speci￿cations, where the coe¢ cients are in all cases below
0.4, but still signi￿cant in all our speci￿cations. The weights that perform better are GDP
(coe¢ cient equal to 0.38) Openness (coe¢ cient equal to 0.31), EU (coe¢ cient equal to
0.32) and Uniform (coe¢ cient equal to 0.32). The lagged dependent variable is positive
18and signi￿cant in all our speci￿cations and it lies between 0.68 and 0.70 in table 8b, and
between 0.61 and 0.75 in table 8c. The demographic variables are the ones that are more
signi￿cant and suggest, surprisingly, that larger countries have lower taxes, and higher
proportion of young people higher taxes.
Finally, table 9 presents results for income tax rate; the results are very similar to the
previous set of tables, where the coe¢ cients of the interaction term are positive, very high
and always signi￿cant in the static model, and they become much lower in the dynamic
version of the model (in this case however the results in tables 9b and 9c di⁄er more).
The weights that work better are GDP (0.355), Uniform (0.267) and Openness (0.24) ,but
in tables 6b they are respectively 0.35, 0.26 and 0.24, while in tables 9c they are higher
and equal to 0.74, 0.52 and 0.59.
In summary, we can observe that for all the ￿scal choices taken in to account, the
dynamic speci￿cation seem to represent reality better and the interaction terms are always
positive and in most of the cases signi￿cant. In the next session we carried out additional
tests to investigate further the nature of these ￿scal interactions.
5.1. Yardstick competition vs other theories
In this section we investigate further interdependences in ￿scal choices in order to dis-
tinguish di⁄erent competitive behavior. We try to do this by exploiting the de￿nition
of yardstick competition. As we said earlier, yardstick competition occurs when citizens
make their voting decisions based on the comparisons of ￿scal policies between domestic
and neighbor policy makers￿choices. Policy-makers anticipate voters behavior and move
their policy decisions in the same directions as their neighboring policy makers. If this is
the case, policy-makers should be particularly concerned about their neighbor colleagues￿
actions in the period of elections. A straightforward way of testing for this is to interact
the variable Ait with the election dummy electit, and estimate two di⁄erent interaction
coe¢ cients, one for the year of election (electit ￿ Ait) and one for all the other period
((1 ￿ electit) ￿ Ait).18
18Another possibilities that have been explored but not reported in this paper, is to use instead of
election-year dummy the year-before-election dummy, or two run two separate regressions, one for the
election years, and the other for the other years. In the ￿rst case the results where better using election
year interaction, and in the second case we did not want to allow all the other coe¢ cient to vary because
we wanted to foucus on the interaction coe¢ cient.
19So if the hypothesis of yardstick competition were true we should observe the coe¢ cient
of electit ￿Ait; being higher and more signi￿cant than the coe¢ cient of (1￿electit)￿Ait:
There should not be instead any di⁄erent behavior in election time for the other type of
￿scal interdependences.
The results for this version of the model are reported in table 10. We present the results
using the dynamic version of the model because it is the one that better represents reality,
we report the regression results only for the IV estimation. We note that the coe¢ cient of
the lagged dependent variable is always positive and signi￿cant in all our speci￿cations.
We focus our analysis on the comparison of the interaction term coe¢ cients. If we look
at table 7 we can clearly see that the coe¢ cient of electit ￿ Ait for aggregated public
expenditure is always much higher and more signi￿cant that the one of (1 ￿ electit) ￿
Ait: So public expenditures setting is much more dependent on neighbors in the period
of election, in particular with respect to GDP (coe¢ cient equal 0.66) and geographical
distance weights (coe¢ cient equal 0.63). This is a clear indication of yardstick competition
that occur mainly with respect to important and geographically close countries, which is
still consistent with the theory of yardstick competition because it is easier for people
to compare ￿scal choice of countries for whom information are more widespread. If we
look at the results for disaggregated public expenditures we can see that this result is
weakly con￿rmed for expenditures in Education and Defence, where the eAit coe¢ cients
are higher than neAit but their signi￿cance is generally lower. There is no sign of of
yardstick competition for expenditure in Health, a common intellectual trend seems to be
the most likely explanation.
On the tax side, the interaction coe¢ cients for statutory taxes do not present a clear
pattern, as we expected a priori, so we can clearly reject the yardstick competition hypoth-
esis, the most likely explanation is tax competition, which is driven by leader countries,
since the weight that perform better is GDP weight. For income taxes, for which there a
theoretical possibility of yardstick competition, given the nature of these taxes, the results
are not completely clear, they weakly support the hypothesis of yardstick competition.
The election year interaction coe¢ cient are much higher than the non-election ones, but
they are not statistically highly signi￿cant. The weight that performs better is the GDP
weight (coe¢ cient equal to 1.83), but we cannot rule completely out the hypothesis of
common trends.
205.2. Does the EU matter?
Finally, our last task is to investigate whether or not being a member of the European
Union has an e⁄ect on government behavior, either in the sense of making ￿scal choices
more or less interdependent on other partners. Note that in our dataset at the beginning
of the period only six19 countries out of seventeen were EU members and at the end they
all had joined the EU but Switzerland and Norway.
In the ￿rst instance, one may think that it more likely that EU members are more
interdependent because they move in a similar competitive and institutional environment
and are subject to similar budget and political constraints, moreover policy makers have
more occasions to meet and discuss formally or informally their plans. However it is also
possible that the opposite can occur, EU non-members are less "protected" than their EU
partners and have to operate in a more open and competitive environment, and therefore
it is possible that they engage in a more competitive behavior than their EU counterparts.
Another possibility is that they may try to mimic EU states behavior because they want
to join the EU and therefore they want to convince EU states to accept them.
To test this hypothesis of di⁄erent competitive behavior between EU members and
non-members we proceed similarly as in the previous session, we multiply the EUit dummy
by the variable (Ait) and we estimate two di⁄erent coe¢ cients for EU (EUit ￿ Ait) and
non-EU countries ((1 ￿ EUit) ￿ Ait). The results are reported in table 11.
Interactions in disaggregated public expenditures present a very di⁄erent pattern de-
pending on whether or not a state is member of the European Union: EU states follow
mainly "leader" countries and other EU states (which is to some extent overlapping since
the largest countries in the sample have been members of the EU since the beginning of
the period taken into account), while non-EU states appear to follow mainly more open
countries. Moreover, the coe¢ cients of the interaction terms for non-EU states is gen-
erally higher than for EU states. This is an indication that non EU states "compete"
more with the outside world especially with more globalized partners and then, once they
are in the EU, interact less with the outside world but more among each other, even
if the level of interaction is lower. So in other words, it seems that the "EU" e⁄ect is
to lower the level of interaction- competition and redirect it toward other EU members.
This is broadly con￿rmed by expenditures in defence. Public dxpenditures in dducation
and dealth present a di⁄erent pattern; there seem to be an high interdependencies among
19They were France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
21EU members but no interdependence at all among non-members, the coe¢ cient are not,
however, very signi￿cant. Corporate taxes present similar results to aggregated public
expenditure where competition is usually higher among non-EU countries especially to-
ward more globalized countries, while EU members compete mainly among themselves
but with less intensity, which makes the EU a kind of "safer" environment for countries
to compete. A di⁄erent picture emerges instead from the results for income taxes, there
is a very low interaction among EU members and very high among non EU; this could
work like a way for future EU members to signal that they are ready to join because their
￿scal policy are very aligned with the EU, and once they are in, they behave more freely.
6. Summary and Conclusion
In this paper we have estimated reaction functions for a set of ￿scal variables, both on
the expenditure and tax side. The aim of the paper was three-fold; ￿rst to determine
whether or not these reaction functions have a non-zero slope, second to investigate their
nature (in case they exist), third to examine if there is an EU e⁄ect.
The theory mainly distinguishes between four theoretical models of competitive be-
havior which generate similar empirical speci￿cations. In order to assess whether these
interactions exist because governments try to attract tax bases (tax competition), to please
voters (yardstick competition), or because there exist ￿scal externalities, or just because
of a common trend. We have relied on a priori hypothesis based on the characteristics of
the above mentioned ￿scal choices and then carried out some additional estimations.
First, with respect to corporate taxes, consistently with the previous empirical studies
on tax competition, we have found that the slope of the reaction function is generally
positive and signi￿cant. In particular, the regression results suggest that tax competition
occurs in Europe mainly with respect to big "leader" countries.
Second, we have found evidence of a similar governments￿behavior in income taxes￿
setting and public expenditures￿decisions. In both cases the reaction functions are al-
ways positively sloped and the weights that perform better are those based on GDP and
geographical distance; in addition to this, if we interact Ait with the election dummy and
we re-estimated the model, this coe¢ cient is always higher and more signi￿cant than the
one interacted with the non-election dummy, this is especially true for aggregated public
expenditures. This seems to con￿rm our a priori hypotheses about a possible existence of
22yardstick competition among European countries, with respect to geographically close and
￿leader￿countries. Moreover, consistently with our expectations, the results for disag-
gregated public expenditures suggest that governments behave strategically mainly with
respect to those expenditures which are more directly comparable such as expenditures
in education.
Finally, interesting and surprisingly, we have found the countries are interdependent
with each other before they join the EU, and than, once they are in, they behave more
independently. This behavior is possibly due to the fact that countries who want to join
the EU want to show to other EU members that they have "aligned" policies for being
accepted and also because the EU as an Institution provides a safer environment where
countries need to compete less with the outside and more among themselves.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics and Data Sources. 
 
Variable      Definition  Source  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
TOT*it  Per Capita Aggregated 
Public Expenditure 
IMF- GFS  510  7765.738  3510.021  1454.487  17815.45 
DEF*it   Per Capita Public 
Expenditures in Defense 
IMF- GFS  510  453.2789  218.6797  94.99315  950.9248 
EDU*it   Per Capita Public 
Expenditures in Education 
IMF- GFS  510  673.6145  431.9319  42.18002  1744.896 
HEA*it   Per Capita Public 
Expenditures in Health 
IMF- GFS  510  692.8419  578.5732  14.13589  2611.358 




510  0.5633353  0.1633065  0.115  0.91 
TINit   Top Income Tax rate  OTPR at 
otpr.org 
510  0.3711412  0.1144252  0.03  0.56 
TRADEGDPit   Total Trade as proportion 
of GDP 
WB-WDI  510  74.77028  42.36072  26.1591  258.9947 
 FDIGDPit   FDI inflows as proportion 
of GDP 
WB-WDI  418  1.539613  3.458893  -.6727549  56.86825 
PYOUNG it  Proportion of population 
less than 14 yrs old 
WB-WDI  510  20.819  3.555802  14.37633  31.32965 
POLD it  Proportion of population 
more than 65 yrs old 
WB-WDI  510  13.767  1.880502  9.161963  17.89806 
PDENSit   Population Density  WB-WDI  510  131.2181  111.6224  11.88694  466.4994 
PFEMit   Proportion of women  WB-WDI  510  51.09029  0.6623244  49.7279  52.8862 
POPUL it  Total population  WB-WDI  510  21,800,000.0
0 
24,100,000.00  339,800.00  82,100,000.00 
GDPPC*it   GDP per capita  WB-WDI  509  21700.75  9900.295  5947.931  71575.19 
 
GOVPARTY it 
Left party members in the 
Government (from 0 to 5) 
CPD  491  2.610  1.413  1  5 
ELECTit   Election year Dummy  CPD  510  .282  .450  0  1 
 
* Variables are expressed at prices 95. 
  
Table 3. Summary Statistics of Fiscal Variables: mean by Countries. 
 
 
State  TOT*it  DEF*it  EDU*it  HEA*it  CAPTAXit  TINit 
AUT  8926.44  238.934  851.7853  1118.16  0.58  0.45 
BEL  10789.4  544.9941  1395.03  184.3257  0.64  0.42 
CHE  8840.73  765.1275  268.4094  1441.846  0.25  0.11 
DEU  7033.48  523.1541  52.79612  1296.287  0.55  0.50 
DNK  11099.6  608.4646  1183.706  238.782  0.56  0.39 
ESP  3532.13  155.4136  196.6576  209.1964  0.60  0.34 
FIN  7075.57  335.3861  929.0599  527.0771  0.50  0.36 
FRA  9369.96  604.835  745.8128  1651.906  0.59  0.44 
GBR  6060.55  698.9667  175.8224  813.8511  0.61  0.43 
GRC  3471.73  380.0008  314.9144  292.8287  0.56  0.42 
IRL  4906.49  185.3613  688.9524  792.3411  0.61  0.42 
ITA  6792.71  247.9011  590.5705  734.663  0.62  0.30 
LUX  11511.5  245.1886  1061.874  287.7775  0.55  0.37 
NLD  10782.6  575.3349  1289.345  1340.934  0.64  0.42 
NOR  9473.67  734.8749  605.7893  500.7318  0.45  0.28 
PRT  2965.88  203.3218  261.4009  208.2823  0.64  0.28 
SWE  9385.03  658.4817  839.5212  139.3221  0.63  0.38 
 Table 4. Aggregated public expenditures
Table 4a. Static Model: all sample  Table 4b. Dynamic Model: all sample Table 4c. Dynamic Model: all sample 
(IV Estimation*) (LSDV-IV Estimation*) (GMM Estimation*)
Hypotheses Common  Yardstick competition Tax/Expenditure  Common  Yardstick competition Tax/Expenditure  Common  Yardstick competition Tax/Expenditure 
Trend Tax/Expenditure Competition Competition Trend Tax/Expenditure Competition Competition Trend Tax/Expenditure Competition Competition
Esternality Esternality Esternality
Weights Uniform  Geographical GDP GDP EU Openess Uniform  Geographical GDP GDP EU Openess Uniform  Geographical GDP GDP EU Openess
Distance Distance Distance Distance Distance Distance
Eit-1 0.697 0.717 0.722 0.711 0.736 0.705 0.822 0.791 0.785 0.873 0.967 0.921
[10.62]*** [12.03]*** [11.64]*** [10.97]*** [13.52]*** [11.38]*** [9.81]*** [10.25]*** [7.98]*** [19.03]*** [14.33]*** [18.75]***
Ait 0.899 0.797 0.777 0.97 0.582 0.569 0.424 0.318 0.259 0.438 0.199 0.285 0.610 0.624 0.466 0.606 0.223 0.295
[3.52]*** [2.94]*** [2.85]** [3.16]*** [3.23]*** [3.27]*** [2.25]** [2.07]* [1.77]* [1.86]* [2.18]** [2.00]* [2.05]** [2.08]** [2.04]** [2.61]*** [2.16]** [2.07]**
electit -51.313 -41.917 -49.358 -45.702 -36.095 -49.707 -48.576 -44.492 -47.292 -45.967 -42.771 -47.903 -18.212 -38.253 -26.296 -23.946 -22.886 -37.248
[0.51] [0.42] [0.47] [0.45] [0.36] [0.49] [0.44] [0.41] [0.42] [0.42] [0.38] [0.43] [0.19] [0.38] [0.29] [0.27] [0.25] [0.35]
womenparlit 25.376 25.443 27.076 25.809 16.817 23.308 9.169 7.79 7.255 8.973 3.741 8.545 41.842 10.127 -12.121 21.732 10.755 36.615
[1.04] [1.04] [1.02] [1.08] [0.67] [1.01] [0.54] [0.48] [0.45] [0.58] [0.22] [0.54] [1.57] [0.43] [0.50] [1.06] [0.36] [1.73]*
govpartyit 45.57 46.727 47.221 47.742 37.344 42.93 46.422 46.317 45.693 47.344 42.573 45.499 37.606 4.611 25.298 16.310 25.215 21.063
[1.22] [1.27] [1.22] [1.40] [0.95] [1.18] [1.39] [1.42] [1.36] [1.43] [1.34] [1.37] [0.85] [0.18] [0.68] [0.55] [0.68] [0.79]
EUit 256.998 216.812 320.231 268.78 249.732 243.196 100.858 78.592 111.907 103.974 85.996 94.698 254.751 379.126 277.501 200.068 63.175 281.659
[1.17] [0.97] [1.24] [1.18] [1.07] [1.09] [1.00] [0.87] [1.09] [1.05] [1.01] [0.94] [0.78] [1.11] [0.99] [0.81] [0.36] [0.86]
gdppcit -0.108 -0.099 -0.128 -0.113 -0.125 -0.118 -0.118 -0.12 -0.137 -0.121 -0.134 -0.119 -0.072 0.008 -0.054 -0.062 -0.138 -0.044
[1.47] [1.15] [1.78]* [1.40] [1.40] [1.55] [5.89]*** [5.26]*** [6.67]*** [4.80]*** [5.67]*** [5.58]*** [1.57] [0.24] [0.90] [1.48] [3.18]*** [1.91]*
tradegdpit-1 -15.987 -16.482 -21.68 -19.638 -31.349 -15.615 -13.398 -14.108 -16.42 -15.084 -19.537 -12.83 -6.997 -8.703 -8.644 -11.118 -22.054 -13.666
[0.90] [0.91] [1.22] [1.09] [1.75] [0.86] [1.24] [1.29] [1.45] [1.38] [1.66] [1.22] [0.86] [1.15] [1.24] [1.49] [2.02]** [1.34]
pyoungit -161.237 -172.125 -104.924 -268.21 -365.894 -208.562 -130.6 -149.572 -142.816 -181.644 -225.765 -145.571 31.688 22.262 4.548 -34.731 -8.731 -57.727
[1.06] [1.16] [0.61] [1.68] [2.42]** [1.40] [1.97]* [2.22]** [1.97]* [2.60]** [2.97]*** [2.31]** [0.75] [0.81] [0.16] [0.99] [0.23] [1.08]
poldit -140.047 -161.451 -59.301 -191.812 -297.172 -160.741 -80.643 -88.994 -55.253 -102.822 -134.145 -89.131 -170.166 6.688 30.993 -122.880 -145.334 -180.735
[0.78] [0.83] [0.30] [1.03] [1.47] [0.86] [0.81] [0.87] [0.59] [1.00] [1.30] [0.87] [0.89] [0.08] [0.73] [1.26] [1.19] [0.84]
populit*10
3 0.423 0.442 0.354 0.551 0.542 0.441 0.251 0.264 0.244 0.309 0.301 0.253 0.032 0.073 0.113 0.136 -0.138 0.123
[1.88]* [2.06]* [1.54] [2.54]** [2.70]** [2.07]* [2.27]** [2.37]** [2.06]* [2.71]** [2.44]** [2.29]** [0.29] [0.88] [0.95] [2.07]** [1.41] [0.85]
Observations 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470
R-squared 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
AR(1) (p>z) 0.01 0.009 0.013 0.027 0.22 0.018
AR(2) (p>z) 0.067 0.065 0.097 0.069 0.069 0.5
Hansen p-value 1 1 1 1 1 1
Robust t statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Table 5. Public Expenditures in Defence
Table 5a. Static Model: all sample  Table 5b. Dynamic Model: all sample Table 5c. Dynamic Model: all sample 
(IV Estimation*) (LSDV-IV Estimation*) (GMM Estimation*)
Hypotheses Common  Yardstick competition Tax/Expenditure  Common  Yardstick competition Tax/Expenditure  Common  Yardstick competition Tax/Expenditure 
Trend Tax/Expenditure Competition Competition Trend Tax/Expenditure Competition Competition Trend Tax/Expenditure Competition Competition
Esternality Esternality Esternality
Weights Uniform  Geographical GDP GDP EU Openess Uniform  Geographical GDP GDP EU Openess Uniform  Geographical GDP GDP EU Openess
Distance Distance Distance Distance Distance Distance
Ait-1 0.532 0.551 0.571 0.534 0.582 0.540 0.566 0.725 0.707 0.671 0.750 0.683
[6.41]*** [6.65]*** [6.78]*** [6.42]*** [7.22]*** [6.58]*** [5.40]*** [10.20]*** [10.59]*** [8.38]*** [9.11]*** [8.37]***
WAit 0.777 0.640 0.623 0.580 0.425 0.819 0.386 0.295 0.272 0.277 0.202 0.416 0.462 0.261 0.241 0.271 0.220 0.375
[5.26]*** [6.17]*** [5.63]*** [5.33]*** [3.91]*** [5.58]*** [4.44]*** [4.93]*** [3.84]*** [4.95]*** [4.06]*** [5.09]*** [4.24]*** [4.95]*** [3.30]*** [4.10]*** [5.20]*** [5.78]***
electit 1.152 1.285 0.842 1.351 2.402 1.448 3.152 3.299 3.183 3.269 3.911 3.315 3.855 3.946 4.179 4.779 4.868 4.246
[0.72] [0.78] [0.44] [0.81] [1.35] [0.90] [1.41] [1.44] [1.32] [1.45] [1.64] [1.48] [1.31] [1.32] [1.38] [1.62] [1.78]* [1.55]
womenparlit -1.072 -1.406 -1.898 -1.230 -1.157 -1.198 -0.328 -0.443 -0.628 -0.388 -0.298 -0.378 1.775 0.249 0.393 0.013 0.346 0.936
[0.54] [0.66] [0.87] [0.62] [0.47] [0.57] [0.27] [0.36] [0.51] [0.32] [0.22] [0.31] [0.90] [0.21] [0.28] [0.01] [0.30] [0.67]
govpartyit 1.946 2.134 2.159 1.627 1.712 1.855 1.035 1.079 1.052 0.868 0.846 0.980 1.960 0.748 1.370 1.564 1.322 1.716
[0.68] [0.75] [0.76] [0.59] [0.65] [0.66] [0.63] [0.67] [0.65] [0.55] [0.57] [0.61] [1.25] [0.65] [1.15] [1.30] [1.05] [1.43]
EUit 16.797 17.748 22.936 16.297 17.112 16.603 7.620 7.821 9.706 7.457 6.821 7.328 -9.961 1.396 -4.125 -12.946 -9.752 -10.981
[1.45] [1.45] [1.75]* [1.52] [1.57] [1.50] [1.35] [1.38] [1.58] [1.50] [1.39] [1.40] [0.62] [0.17] [0.60] [1.17] [0.98] [1.11]
gdppcit 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.006
[1.53] [1.65] [1.38] [1.65] [1.35] [1.41] [1.92]* [2.01]* [1.76]* [2.07]* [1.78]* [1.82]* [3.23]*** [2.75]*** [3.02]*** [2.47]** [3.07]*** [6.29]***
tradegdpit-1 -0.331 -0.388 -0.363 -0.446 -0.752 -0.635 0.126 0.126 0.158 0.082 -0.041 -0.029 1.026 0.805 0.732 0.859 0.317 0.561
[0.92] [1.08] [1.02] [1.13] [1.49] [1.63] [0.69] [0.73] [1.02] [0.44] [0.16] [0.15] [3.37]*** [2.97]*** [2.73]*** [2.81]*** [1.22] [2.45]**
pyoungit -16.418 -18.692 -18.540 -14.846 -29.116 -18.593 -5.816 -6.910 -6.483 -5.450 -10.354 -6.396 0.418 1.481 -1.569 2.586 -0.415 0.696
[2.20]** [2.52]** [2.44]** [2.10]* [3.58]*** [2.43]** [1.29] [1.58] [1.50] [1.28] [2.31]** [1.37] [0.12] [0.60] [0.60] [0.98] [0.22] [0.29]
poldit 14.248 12.044 14.747 14.953 2.354 11.466 13.048 11.753 12.908 13.156 7.518 11.782 20.387 16.153 14.921 21.745 15.368 19.405
[1.43] [1.25] [1.44] [1.52] [0.23] [1.15] [2.03]* [1.92]* [2.12]* [2.12]* [1.30] [1.88]* [3.05]*** [4.48]*** [2.19]** [3.56]*** [4.40]*** [3.47]***
populit*10
4 -0.302 -0.281 -0.293 -0.340 -0.255 -0.285 -0.158 -0.141 -0.141 -0.174 -0.125 -0.149 -0.022 -0.014 -0.011 -0.011 -0.014 -0.017
[3.25]*** [3.10]*** [2.73]** [3.81]*** [2.82]** [3.02]*** [2.83]** [2.59]** [2.37]** [3.17]*** [2.38]** [2.66]** [1.70]* [0.95] [1.14] [1.23] [1.38] [1.53]
Observations 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470
R-squared 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
AR(1) (p>z) 0.008 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.011 0.012
AR(2) (p>z) 0.322 0.226 0.232 0.271 0.233 0.265
Hansen p-value 1 1 1 1 1 1
Robust t statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Table 6. Public Expenditures in Health
Table 6a. Static Model: all sample  Table 6b. Dynamic Model: all sample Table 6c. Dynamic Model: all sample 
(IV Estimation*) (IV Estimation*) (GMM Estimation*)
Hypotheses Common  Yardstick competition Tax/Expenditure  Common  Yardstick competition Tax/Expenditure  Common  Yardstick competition Tax/Expenditure 
Trend Tax/Expenditure Competition Competition Trend Tax/Expenditure Competition Competition Trend Tax/Expenditure Competition Competition
Esternality Esternality Esternality
Weights Uniform  Geographical GDP GDP EU Openess Uniform  Geographical GDP GDP EU Openess Uniform  Geographical GDP GDP EU Openess
Distance Distance Distance Distance Distance Distance
Eit-1 0.649 0.648 0.638 0.641 0.640 0.651 0.806 0.707 0.737 0.744 0.754 0.762
[14.54]*** [14.62]*** [14.12]*** [14.13]*** [13.96]*** [15.27]*** [18.88]*** [7.98]*** [7.54]*** [7.59]*** [7.87]*** [8.86]***
Ait 0.805 0.811 0.745 0.311 0.477 0.895 0.391 0.272 0.216 0.140 0.290 0.631 0.167 0.082 0.196 0.128 0.218 0.239
[1.20] [1.50] [2.39]** [0.93] [1.76]* [1.19] [0.86] [0.88] [1.13] [0.84] [1.19] [1.15] [0.70] [0.20] [0.72] [0.50] [0.56] [0.56]
electit 3.882 3.179 6.227 4.138 6.119 4.653 1.864 1.487 2.382 1.945 3.321 2.556 1.320 0.184 -0.504 1.976 2.566 1.328
[0.47] [0.39] [0.67] [0.53] [0.75] [0.55] [0.30] [0.25] [0.40] [0.32] [0.50] [0.38] [0.12] [0.03] [0.08] [0.29] [0.35] [0.21]
womenparlit -15.026 -14.628 -12.881 -14.195 -13.397 -14.732 -9.904 -9.778 -9.394 -9.606 -8.995 -9.680 -5.151 -13.119 -17.448 -9.789 -10.562 -12.900
[2.34]** [2.31]** [2.03]* [2.30]** [2.26]** [2.33]** [2.67]** [2.73]** [2.63]** [2.75]** [2.56]** [2.59]** [2.72]*** [3.04]*** [2.74]*** [1.46] [1.64] [2.46]**
govpartyit 18.048 16.264 20.712 17.190 17.282 18.701 10.603 9.934 11.396 10.297 10.319 11.179 5.669 4.076 4.761 8.258 7.638 5.856
[1.94]* [1.68] [2.45]** [1.82]* [1.85]* [2.02]* [2.32]** [2.28]** [2.61]** [2.33]** [2.39]** [2.42]** [1.43] [1.03] [0.99] [1.49] [1.41] [1.13]
EUit 48.053 48.223 36.844 49.362 49.224 50.411 42.248 40.893 37.216 42.590 44.301 46.224 28.587 57.693 164.563 104.718 114.875 95.447
[0.73] [0.71] [0.58] [0.72] [0.74] [0.73] [1.15] [1.14] [1.08] [1.19] [1.27] [1.15] [1.19] [1.18] [1.27] [0.87] [1.00] [1.20]
gdppcit 0.044 0.045 0.053 0.044 0.046 0.043 0.017 0.016 0.018 0.017 0.019 0.018 0.011 0.018 0.033 0.032 0.033 0.020
[1.86]* [1.90]* [2.19]** [2.12]* [2.46]** [1.90]* [1.38] [1.40] [1.55] [1.51] [2.00]* [1.50] [2.09]** [2.26]** [2.15]** [1.57] [1.72]* [1.70]*
fdigdpit-1 -36.834 -38.997 -33.911 -38.981 -39.888 -41.116 -32.873 -34.203 -32.881 -34.032 -34.329 -34.997 -33.483 -49.880 -54.555 -49.977 -49.846 -47.205
[1.88]* [1.81]* [1.57] [1.86]* [1.84]* [1.85]* [1.69] [1.67] [1.54] [1.66] [1.63] [1.63] [6.37]*** [2.36]** [2.10]** [1.79]* [1.77]* [1.97]**
pyoungit -15.382 -22.520 -26.717 -23.737 -17.557 -24.280 -13.989 -16.680 -17.723 -17.918 -15.213 -19.923 1.482 20.114 33.102 9.154 12.229 10.771
[0.72] [1.03] [1.15] [1.20] [0.85] [1.16] [1.29] [1.42] [1.58] [1.47] [1.35] [1.50] [0.28] [1.47] [1.86]* [0.64] [0.98] [1.15]
poldit -23.570 -29.764 -30.814 -27.676 -26.846 -36.241 -10.128 -12.673 -12.862 -12.226 -12.030 -18.485 -18.468 -32.749 -49.241 -36.362 -36.590 -37.998
[0.69] [0.82] [0.88] [0.86] [0.84] [1.04] [0.61] [0.83] [0.80] [0.81] [0.79] [1.15] [1.78]* [1.51] [1.21] [1.41] [1.41] [1.55]
populit*10
4 0.962 0.895 0.865 0.996 0.908 0.970 0.709 0.686 0.686 0.728 0.681 0.714 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[3.71]*** [3.23]*** [3.05]*** [4.06]*** [3.30]*** [3.63]*** [4.22]*** [4.43]*** [4.53]*** [4.16]*** [4.09]*** [4.10]*** [3.66]*** [1.16] [1.00] [1.52] [1.46] [1.39]
Observations 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470
R-squared 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
AR(1) (p>z) 0.002 0.029 0.052 0.047 0.053 0.045
AR(2) (p>z) 0.361 0.28 0.233 0.246 0.236 0.258
Hansen p-value 1 1 1 1 1 1
Robust t statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Table 7. Public Expenditures in Education
Table 7a. Static Model: all sample  Table 7b. Dynamic Model: all sample Table 7c. Dynamic Model: all sample 
(IV Estimation*) (IV Estimation*) (GMM Estimation*)
Hypotheses Common  Yardstick competition Tax/Expenditure  Common  Yardstick competition Tax/Expenditure  Common  Yardstick competition Tax/Expenditure 
Trend Tax/Expenditure Competition Competition Trend Tax/Expenditure Competition Competition Trend Tax/Expenditure Competition Competition
Esternality Esternality Esternality
Weights Uniform  Geographical GDP GDP EU Openess Uniform  Geographical GDP GDP EU Openess Uniform  Geographical GDP GDP EU Openess
Distance Distance Distance Distance Distance Distance
Eit-1 0.794 0.792 0.780 0.793 0.791 0.792 0.735 0.808 0.811 0.869 0.885 0.793
[12.85]*** [12.68]*** [11.98]*** [12.83]*** [12.81]*** [12.58]*** [9.54]*** [10.65]*** [18.64]*** [10.64]*** [13.13]*** [13.12]***
Ait 0.876 1.176 0.752 1.791 0.549 0.587 0.263 0.143 0.129 0.307 0.068 0.235 0.615 0.703 0.461 1.109 0.209 0.599
[2.87]** [2.33]** [1.59] [1.79]* [1.66] [2.57]** [1.31] [0.97] [1.94]* [1.23] [0.67] [1.36] [1.82]* [1.97]** [2.05]** [1.32] [1.32] [1.82]*
electit -3.997 -2.520 -2.543 -3.781 -3.190 -4.057 -2.105 -2.100 -2.022 -2.195 -2.181 -2.044 -0.831 0.475 -0.540 -1.559 -0.977 -1.235
[0.55] [0.34] [0.30] [0.52] [0.41] [0.56] [0.32] [0.32] [0.30] [0.33] [0.33] [0.31] [0.13] [0.08] [0.09] [0.27] [0.17] [0.20]
womenparlit 0.130 -0.166 1.284 0.836 -0.399 0.064 0.516 0.338 0.602 0.535 0.313 0.559 -1.103 0.663 -0.247 1.284 3.022 3.619
[0.02] [0.03] [0.22] [0.15] [0.08] [0.01] [0.21] [0.14] [0.24] [0.22] [0.13] [0.23] [0.21] [0.20] [0.04] [0.30] [0.82] [0.58]
govpartyit 8.386 8.198 8.498 8.778 7.153 7.815 5.961 5.757 5.875 5.897 5.630 5.839 4.734 7.274 4.475 3.781 4.734 2.641
[1.45] [1.43] [1.49] [1.55] [1.14] [1.36] [2.26]** [2.29]** [2.25]** [2.25]** [2.24]** [2.27]** [1.70]* [1.59] [1.21] [1.42] [1.94]* [0.65]
EUit -110.967 -113.662 -81.542 -108.785 -105.788 -108.377 -14.836 -14.153 -10.438 -13.739 -13.269 -14.856 -27.396 -2.990 22.150 26.891 12.939 28.669
[1.92]* [1.98]* [1.37] [1.86]* [1.68] [1.88]* [0.72] [0.69] [0.53] [0.68] [0.66] [0.73] [0.73] [0.09] [0.58] [0.49] [0.29] [0.53]
gdppcit 0.007 0.012 0.004 0.008 0.005 0.008 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 0.013 0.016 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.015
[1.54] [1.69] [0.98] [1.42] [0.91] [1.52] [0.50] [0.52] [0.75] [0.57] [0.64] [0.36] [2.40]** [2.40]** [1.51] [1.21] [1.29] [2.40]**
tradegdpit-1 -2.046 -1.549 -2.598 -2.375 -3.246 -2.118 -1.862 -1.957 -2.081 -2.031 -2.165 -1.809 -1.271 -2.211 -3.260 -2.676 -2.809 -1.632
[1.64] [1.01] [1.88]* [1.86]* [2.67]** [1.70] [3.08]*** [3.02]*** [2.87]** [2.94]*** [2.87]** [3.10]*** [1.73]* [2.34]** [2.76]*** [2.71]*** [2.48]** [1.79]*
pyoungit -12.043 -9.350 -3.279 -15.695 -31.414 -15.106 -14.535 -15.549 -14.044 -16.137 -18.277 -15.014 -16.788 -31.341 -22.708 -26.385 -30.786 -30.422
[0.73] [0.57] [0.22] [0.96] [1.50] [0.89] [1.84]* [1.87]* [1.83]* [1.94]* [2.05]* [1.86]* [1.74]* [1.96]* [1.71]* [2.45]** [2.43]** [2.63]***
poldit -31.986 -36.948 -27.145 -38.498 -42.985 -33.279 -12.298 -11.767 -10.888 -12.589 -12.561 -13.529 -23.518 -25.378 -41.205 -24.922 -30.465 -48.753
[0.87] [0.85] [0.74] [1.01] [1.03] [0.90] [1.06] [1.03] [0.98] [1.13] [1.08] [1.11] [0.77] [1.21] [1.22] [0.76] [0.83] [1.04]
populit*10
3 -0.247 -1.350 -1.715 -0.892 0.769 0.039 0.796 0.846 0.669 0.822 0.110 0.811 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.10] [0.52] [0.76] [0.40] [0.32] [0.02] [0.69] [0.70] [0.61] [0.69] [0.86] [0.70] [1.28] [0.36] [0.62] [0.79] [0.96] [0.03]
Observations 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470
R-squared 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
AR(1) (p>z) 0.079 0.052 0.068 0.063 0.07 0.09
AR(2) (p>z) 0.315 0.245 0.279 0.277 0.331 0.287
Hansen p-value 1 1 1 1 1 1
Robust t statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Table 8. Stautory Tax Rates
Table 8a. Static Model: all sample  Table 8b. Dynamic Model: all sample Table 8c. Dynamic Model: all sample 
(IV Estimation*) (IV Estimation*) (GMM Estimation*)
Hypotheses Common  Yardstick competition Tax/Expenditure  Common  Yardstick competition Tax/Expenditure  Common  Yardstick competition Tax/Expenditure 
Trend Tax/Expenditure Competition Competition Trend Tax/Expenditure Competition Competition Trend Tax/Expenditure Competition Competition
Esternality Esternality Esternality
Weights Uniform  Geographical GDP GDP EU Openess Uniform  Geographical GDP GDP EU Openess Uniform  Geographical GDP GDP EU Openess
Distance Distance Distance Distance Distance Distance
Eit-1 0.685 0.703 0.698 0.684 0.689 0.693 0.616 0.749 0.699 0.716 0.711 0.635
[19.46]*** [23.78]*** [20.76]*** [19.33]*** [21.46]*** [20.99]*** [5.63]*** [12.91]*** [8.47]*** [9.46]*** [10.18]*** [7.50]***
Ait 1.113 1.063 1.065 1.283 1.124 1.154 0.329 0.265 0.274 0.378 0.321 0.310 0.371 0.231 0.274 0.207 0.247 0.345
[5.40]*** [4.20]*** [4.11]*** [6.24]*** [5.35]*** [5.24]*** [3.32]*** [2.97]*** [2.60]** [3.63]*** [3.79]*** [3.20]*** [2.34]** [2.07]** [1.95]* [1.56] [1.84]* [1.97]**
electit 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003
[0.26] [0.29] [0.01] [0.19] [0.42] [0.26] [0.75] [0.75] [0.83] [0.76] [0.69] [0.75] [0.91] [0.76] [0.77] [0.69] [0.70] [0.76]
womenparlit*10 0.244 0.217 1.309 0.712 0.856 0.287 0.235 0.238 0.519 0.380 0.416 0.255 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000
[0.13] [0.11] [0.63] [0.33] [0.44] [0.15] [0.39] [0.42] [0.79] [0.57] [0.67] [0.44] [0.08] [1.01] [0.59] [0.24] [0.37] [0.03]
govpartyit -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
[0.15] [0.41] [0.54] [0.02] [0.14] [0.16] [0.56] [0.45] [0.28] [0.63] [0.56] [0.56] [0.16] [0.31] [0.10] [0.34] [0.53] [0.58]
EUit 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.059 0.018 0.012 0.045 0.028 0.040
[0.07] [0.12] [0.02] [0.06] [0.07] [0.01] [0.55] [0.64] [0.52] [0.55] [0.49] [0.57] [1.24] [1.53] [1.18] [1.51] [1.50] [1.35]
gdppcit10
5 0.034 -0.079 0.065 0.193 0.128 0.106 -0.129 -0.177 -0.137 -0.824 -0.106 -0.121 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.002
[0.10] [0.20] [0.17] [0.59] [0.38] [0.30] [1.14] [1.52] [1.12] [0.68] [0.98] [1.05] [0.78] [0.41] [0.05] [0.01] [0.81] [0.58]
tradegdpit-1*10 0.064 0.271 -0.195 0.361 0.271 0.000 0.198 0.301 0.176 0.287 0.267 0.215 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.09] [0.30] [0.24] [0.51] [0.38] [0.00] [0.59] [0.85] [0.53] [0.91] [0.82] [0.63] [0.98] [0.23] [0.36] [0.25] [0.97] [0.63]
pyoungit 0.014 0.011 0.011 0.018 0.015 0.013 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.001
[1.77]* [1.31] [1.25] [2.35]** [1.82]* [1.54] [3.49]*** [2.93]*** [2.65]** [3.75]*** [3.19]*** [3.13]*** [0.55] [0.92] [0.86] [0.29] [0.46] [0.22]
poldit 0.004 -0.001 -0.007 0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.012 0.004 0.006 0.008
[0.41] [0.08] [0.90] [0.20] [0.09] [0.14] [0.96] [0.67] [0.43] [0.86] [0.66] [0.80] [0.37] [1.36] [1.82]* [0.43] [0.74] [0.73]
populit*10
7 -0.389 -0.374 -0.397 -0.510 -0.436 -0.385 -0.195 -0.184 -0.191 -0.230 -0.206 -0.190 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[4.28]*** [3.50]*** [3.43]*** [5.07]*** [4.22]*** [4.00]*** [5.54]*** [5.25]*** [5.67]*** [5.88]*** [5.18]*** [5.17]*** [0.22] [2.07]** [1.15] [1.08] [1.74]* [0.73]
Observations 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470
R-squared 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
AR(1) (p>z) 0.1 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.009
AR(2) (p>z) 0.51 0.598 0.612 0.504 0.596 0.597
Hansen p-value 1 1 1 1 1 1
Robust t statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Table 9. Income Tax Rates
Table 9a. Static Model: all sample  Table 9b. Dynamic Model: all sample Table 9c. Dynamic Model: all sample 
(IV Estimation*) (LSDV-IV Estimation*) (GMM Estimation*)
Hypotheses Common  Yardstick competition Tax/Expenditure  Common  Yardstick competition Tax/Expenditure  Common  Yardstick competition Tax/Expenditure 
Trend Tax/Expenditure Competition Competition Trend Tax/Expenditure Competition Competition Trend Tax/Expenditure Competition Competition
Esternality Esternality Esternality
Weights Uniform  Geographical GDP GDP EU Openess Uniform  Geographical GDP GDP EU Openess Uniform  Geographical GDP GDP EU Openess
Distance Distance Distance Distance Distance Distance
Eit-1 0.708 0.715 0.709 0.705 0.710 0.710 0.530 0.667 0.615 0.434 0.490 0.543
[15.27]*** [14.58]*** [15.01]*** [16.47]*** [15.28]*** [15.36]*** [4.06]*** [7.73]*** [5.22]*** [3.67]*** [2.95]*** [5.57]***
Ait 0.958 0.824 0.576 1.188 0.834 1.015 0.267 0.182 0.141 0.355 0.220 0.238 0.529 0.336 0.333 0.746 0.383 0.594
[2.69]** [2.63]** [2.39]** [3.06]*** [2.83]** [2.62]** [2.36]** [2.22]** [2.01]* [2.48]** [1.92]* [2.08]* [2.97]*** [2.65]*** [2.20]** [3.16]*** [2.02]** [3.72]***
electit -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.003
[0.82] [0.87] [1.48] [1.31] [0.82] [0.83] [0.86] [0.87] [0.95] [0.94] [0.84] [0.86] [1.22] [1.40] [1.51] [1.97]** [1.76]* [0.51]
womenparlit 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.183 0.210 0.551 0.409 0.387 0.173 0.008 -0.001 0.002 0.009 0.007 0.005
[0.19] [0.21] [0.53] [0.38] [0.38] [0.17] [0.12] [0.13] [0.34] [0.25] [0.24] [0.11] [1.50] [0.44] [0.35] [1.64] [1.53] [1.33]
govpartyit 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 0.002
[1.54] [1.55] [1.22] [1.45] [1.55] [1.52] [1.68] [1.68] [1.43] [1.58] [1.69] [1.65] [0.64] [0.85] [0.16] [0.49] [0.30] [0.78]
EUit -0.036 -0.038 -0.022 -0.030 -0.039 -0.038 -0.006 -0.005 -0.002 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.074 -0.025 -0.037 -0.031 -0.030 -0.037
[1.25] [1.23] [0.86] [1.14] [1.44] [1.33] [0.65] [0.62] [0.22] [0.48] [0.81] [0.67] [1.16] [0.69] [1.18] [0.60] [0.57] [0.99]
gdppcit10
5 -0.065 -0.138 -0.154 0.135 0.095 -0.004 0.206 -0.144 -0.145 0.845 0.574 0.184 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.12] [0.26] [0.26] [0.23] [0.16] [0.01] [0.12] [0.08] [0.07] [0.43] [0.28] [0.10] [0.75] [0.37] [0.98] [0.86] [0.09] [0.96]
tradegdpit-1*10 0.297 0.596 0.974 0.513 0.961 0.214 0.249 1.898 2.554 0.564 2.249 0.909 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
[0.23] [0.41] [0.78] [0.46] [0.81] [0.19] [0.04] [0.32] [0.46] [0.12] [0.41] [0.17] [0.12] [0.62] [0.39] [0.33] [1.12] [0.16]
pyoungit -0.004 0.000 0.005 -0.002 0.006 -0.001 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.005 -0.004 0.006 -0.006 0.006 0.015 -0.011
[0.24] [0.02] [0.31] [0.14] [0.39] [0.05] [0.70] [0.89] [1.10] [0.76] [1.13] [0.85] [0.40] [1.11] [0.44] [0.46] [1.49] [1.01]
poldit -0.013 -0.011 -0.001 -0.009 -0.009 -0.013 -0.007 -0.005 -0.003 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.015 -0.005 -0.018 -0.013 -0.004 -0.033
[0.37] [0.31] [0.05] [0.28] [0.30] [0.40] [0.62] [0.47] [0.31] [0.57] [0.52] [0.56] [0.87] [0.77] [0.72] [0.64] [0.20] [2.77]***
populit*10
8 0.740 0.400 0.460 0.940 -0.060 0.670 -0.031 -0.044 -0.041 -0.024 -0.054 -0.036 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.40] [0.22] [0.26] [0.49] [0.03] [0.36] [0.54] [0.77] [0.72] [0.41] [0.91] [0.63] [0.48] [0.61] [0.57] [0.11] [0.53] [1.14]
Observations 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470
R-squared 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
AR(1) (p>z) 0.01 0.012 0.007 0.015 0.016 0.017
AR(2) (p>z) 0.067 0.065 0.097 0.069 0.069 0.5
Hansen p-value 1 1 1 1 1 1
Robust t statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Table 10. Dynamic Model: testing for Yardstick Competition
(IV Estimation*)
Fiscal Hypotheses Common  Yardstick competition Tax/Expenditure 
Choices Trend Tax/Expenditure Competition Competition
Esternality
Weights Uniform  Geographical GDP GDP EU Openess
Distance Distance
Eit-1 0.572 0.598 0.673 0.697 0.717 0.692
[9.13]*** [10.36]*** [6.69]*** [10.06]*** [10.59]*** [10.90]***
TOT electit*Ait 0.552 0.635 0.584 0.666 0.545 0.373
[2.43]** [2.27]** [0.83] [1.98]* [2.78]** [1.76]*
(1-electit)*Ait 0.279 0.021 0.320 0.326 0.126 0.295
[2.38]** [0.08] [0.92] [0.96] [1.03] [1.11]
Eit-1 0.497 0.536 0.507 0.565 0.580 0.533
[4.47]*** [4.59]*** [3.76]*** [6.16]*** [6.83]*** [6.10]***
DEF electit*Ait 0.723 0.651 0.983 0.525 0.342 0.787
[1.43] [1.05] [1.52] [0.94] [1.20] [1.33]
(1-electit)*Ait 0.213 0.129 0.009 0.203 0.160 0.233
[0.83] [0.41] [0.04] [1.02] [1.38] [0.88]
Eit-1 0.650 0.656 0.709 0.728 0.713 0.725
[14.73]*** [14.19]*** [21.22]*** [15.56]*** [18.49]*** [16.24]***
HEA electit*Ait 0.403 0.674 0.362 0.593 0.655 0.944
[0.36] [1.49] [0.73] [1.21] [1.25] [1.01]
(1-electit)*Ait 0.537 0.583 0.463 -0.092 0.076 0.336
[0.75] [1.00] [0.94] [0.49] [0.27] [0.46]
Eit-1 0.776 0.790 0.757 0.779 0.811 0.763
[14.51]*** [11.45]*** [12.37]*** [14.42]*** [17.75]*** [13.93]***
EDU electit*Ait 0.663 0.344 0.574 0.886 0.019 0.569
[1.55] [0.20] [0.94] [1.08] [0.09] [0.96]
(1-electit)*Ait 0.278 0.285 0.022 0.336 0.083 0.020
[1.44] [0.29] [0.12] [0.81] [0.30] [0.06]
Eit-1 0.657 0.658 0.665 0.684 0.661 0.685
[13.49]*** [14.44]*** [15.27]*** [19.33]*** [12.80]*** [18.64]***
CAPTAX electit*Ait -0.182 -0.768 -0.430 0.007 1.288 -0.239
[0.15] [0.82] [0.48] [0.01] [1.40] [0.12]
(1-electit)*Ait 0.720 0.955 0.674 0.544 0.074 0.589
[1.28] [2.12]* [1.83]* [1.42] [0.24] [0.73]
Eit-1 0.617 0.663 0.714 0.679 0.694 0.673
[7.56]*** [10.92]*** [10.29]*** [9.90]*** [13.55]*** [9.58]***
TIN electit*Ait 1.414 0.063 0.144 1.838 0.875 1.445
[1.70] [0.08] [0.14] [1.24] [1.03] [1.40]
(1-electit)*Ait 0.344 0.466 0.092 -0.206 0.035 -0.030
[0.87] [0.79] [0.25] [0.38] [0.10] [0.10]
Robust t statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Table 11. Dynamic Model: testing for EU effect
(IV Estimation*)
Fiscal Hypotheses Common  Yardstick competition Tax/Expenditure 
Choices Trend Tax/Expenditure Competition Competition
Esternality
Weights Uniform  Geographical GDP GDP EU Openess
Distance Distance
Eit-1 0.637 0.663 0.670 0.680 0.674 0.678
[10.83]*** [14.80]*** [12.12]*** [20.04]*** [17.19]*** [13.34]***
TOT EUit*Ait 0.279 0.517 0.165 0.436 0.370 0.191
[1.27] [1.88]* [0.66] [3.22]*** [3.04]*** [1.16]
(1-EUit)*Ait 0.935 0.375 0.615 0.290 0.410 0.710
[2.73]** [0.66] [1.76]* [0.96] [2.34]** [2.01]*
Eit-1 0.505 0.525 0.556 0.556 0.572 0.543
[4.59]*** [4.54]*** [6.40]*** [6.40]*** [6.84]*** [6.63]***
DEF EUit*Ait 0.240 0.296 0.024 0.024 0.267 0.267
[1.20] [2.48]** [0.10] [0.10] [3.58]*** [2.15]**
(1-EUit)*Ait 0.585 0.281 0.529 0.529 0.133 0.588
[2.09]* [1.60] [1.52] [1.52] [1.77]* [2.50]**
Eit-1 0.670 0.661 0.738 0.697 0.718 0.706
[10.05]*** [13.12]*** [12.87]*** [16.51]*** [19.06]*** [16.74]***
HEA EUit*Ait 0.568 0.717 0.744 0.118 0.444 0.481
[0.74] [1.08] [1.08] [0.67] [1.30] [0.85]
(1-EUit)*Ait 0.285 0.394 0.530 0.256 0.107 0.756
[0.49] [1.17] [1.58] [1.23] [0.54] [1.16]
Eit-1 0.840 0.781 0.796 0.795 0.802 0.788
[9.48]*** [9.51]*** [8.34]*** [10.65]*** [12.35]*** [10.01]***
EDU EUit*Ait 0.540 0.273 0.122 0.477 0.158 0.263
[1.55] [1.30] [0.80] [0.97] [1.14] [1.01]
(1-EUit)*Ait -0.063 0.356 0.059 0.401 -0.134 0.291
[0.10] [1.32] [0.27] [0.64] [1.40] [1.33]
Eit-1 0.637 0.663 0.670 0.680 0.674 0.678
[10.83]*** [14.80]*** [12.12]*** [20.04]*** [17.19]*** [13.34]***
CAPTAX EUit*Ait 0.279 0.517 0.165 0.436 0.370 0.191
[1.27] [1.88]* [0.66] [3.22]*** [3.04]*** [1.16]
(1-EUit)*Ait 0.935 0.375 0.615 0.290 0.410 0.710
[2.73]** [0.66] [1.76]* [0.96] [2.34]** [2.01]*
Eit-1 0.634 0.668 0.718 0.709 0.709 0.706
[10.45]*** [11.11]*** [14.70]*** [15.66]*** [16.43]*** [15.29]***
TIN EUit*Ait 0.465 0.148 0.040 0.218 0.166 0.128
[1.94]* [0.40] [0.28] [1.52] [1.34] [0.81]
(1-EUit)*Ait 0.828 0.510 0.247 0.601 0.338 0.767
[2.92]** [1.86]* [1.20] [1.82]* [2.04]* [2.23]**
Robust t statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%CESifo Working Paper Series 
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